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A Theory and Test of Credit Rationing: Comment 
By CORRY F. AzzI AND JAMES C. COX* 
One frequently encounters the casual em- 
pirical conclusion that some consumers and 
firms are not able to borrow as much as they 
would like at market rates of interest. The 
existence of these rejected offers to pay mar- 
ket rates of interest is then said to constitute 
"credit rationing." Marshall Freimer and 
Myron Gordon, in addition to Dwight Jaffee 
and Franco Modigliani, assume that rejected 
market interest rate offers exist and then 
attempt to explain -why lenders might engage 
in such "credit rationing." 
Our analysis begins by questioning the 
prevalent identification of credit rationing 
with rejected offers to pay market rates of 
interest. This concept of credit rationing is 
apparently derived by analogy with the 
theory of commodity markets under cer- 
tainty. In that theory, any economic agent 
who makes an effective demand for a com- 
modity, that is, who offers to pay its market 
price, is subject to nonprice commodity ra- 
tioning if his demand is not supplied. The 
common extension of this conclusion to credit 
markets is that any economic agent who 
offers to pay the market rate of interest on 
some type of loan is subject to credit ration- 
ing if his "demand" for credit is not supplied. 
We argue that this concept of credit ration- 
ing is not useful because it is based on an in- 
appropriate implicit assumption that an offer 
to pay the market rate of interest on a loan 
constitutes an effective demand for credit. In 
Section I we show that the distinction be- 
tween a borrower's wants and demands for 
credit depends not only on the rate of interest 
offered, but also on the amount of collateral 
offered and on the borrower's equity. There- 
fore, if one is to have a concept of credit ra- 
tioning that refers to nonsupplied effective 
demands for loans, rather than unsatisfied 
wants, it must involve analysis of lender re- 
sponse to offers of interest rate-collateral- 
equity combinations rather than only inter- 
est rate offers. 
Freimer and Gordon consider the case of a 
risk-neutral lender who faces a certain cost of 
funds and observe that his supply of credit 
to a borrower may not be an increasing func- 
tion of the rate of interest offered by the 
borrower. They attach significance to this 
observation, saying that it raises the possi- 
bility of unstable equilibria and protracted 
excess demand in credit markets; this has 
been called - "disequilibrium credit ration- 
ing." In Sections II and III we show that, 
under various conditions, the supply of credit 
to a borrower is an increasing function of the 
amounts of collateral and equity offered by 
the borrower. Thus under the conditions as- 
sumed by Freimer-Gordon, and under more 
general conditions, a borrower will be sup- 
plied more credit if he offers more collateral 
or equity. 
Jaffee and Modigliani's primary concern is 
with "equilibrium credit rationing." They 
assume that a lender can act as a discrimi- 
nating monopolist and conclude that he will 
ration some borrowers if he is subject to an 
institutional constraint which requires him to 
charge the same interest rate to borrowers 
with different demand curves for credit. In 
Section IV we demonstrate that credit ra- 
tioning is not optimal for any lender unless 
there are effective institutional constraints 
on the collateral and equity terms of loan 
contracts in addition to an effective con- 
straint on interest rates. Therefore, given the 
Jaff ee and Modigliani assumption of a single 
interest rate constraint, their conclusion that 
credit rationing is rational for a monopolistic 
lender is shown to be false. 
I. Collateral, Equity, and Effective 
Demand for Loans 
We proceed to an analysis of the role of 
equity and collateral in transforming a desire 
for credit into an effective demand for a loan. 
Assume that a lender has preferences defined 
over his random terminal wealth x, and that 
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he prefers more wealth to less. He begins 
with some initial wealth w>O and lends an 
amount 1, where 0 _ I < w, to a borrower who 
invests it in an opportunity which yields the 
constant stochastic rate of return 0, where 
0> -1. The lender is assumed to invest the 
rest of his wealth (w-l) at the constant 
stochastic rate of return p, where p_ - 1. If 
the loan is repaid, then the lender's terminal 
wealth is the sum of the principal and inter- 
est on the loan (1+r)l, and the value of his 
other investment (1+p)(w-1), and can be 
written as (1+p)w+(r-p)1. 
The amount the borrower invests is the 
sum of the amount of the loan 1, and the 
amount of the borrower's equity y, where 
y>0. The loan will be in default if 0 is less 
than the default rate of return 0*, which is the 
lowest rate of return on the borrower's in- 
vestment sufficient to pay the principal and 
interest on the loan. 
(1) rl-y 
I + y 
If the borrower provides some collateral, 
the lender can obtain payment of principal 
and interest at some rates of return that are 
below the default rate of return on the bor- 
rower's investment. Let the borrower provide 
as collateral an asset that has value z, where 
z> O, at the time the loan contract is written. 
The subsequent value of the collateral is the 
random variable (1 +lr)z, where 7r is the con- 
stant stochastic rate of return on the col- 
lateral asset and w ? - 1. The lender will ob- 
tain payment of principal and interest on a 
collateralized loan as long as the total re- 
turns on the investment (l+O)(l+y), plus 
the value of the collateral (1 +7r) z, exceed the 
principal and interest due on the loan (1 + r)1. 
Thus the lender will collect principal and in- 
terest if 0 is not less than the repayment rate 
of return 0, where 
(2) ^ rl-y-(1 + ir)z 
(2) = 
~~ I + Y 
If 0 is less than 0 then the lender's terminal 
wealth is the sum of the values of his alterna- 
tive investment and the borrower's invest- 
ment and collateral. Thus the lender's ter- 
minal wealth x for all values of 0 is given by 
the following function: 
(1 + p)w + (0 - p)l + (1 + O)y 
(3) x + (1 + wr)z, for-1 ? 0 <0 
(1 +p)w+ (r-p)l,for 0 ? 
If a loan transaction is to be made, the 
,terms of the transaction must provide the 
lender with a distribution of terminal wealth 
that he prefers to all other attainable distri- 
butions. Unless the borrower has monopoly 
control of the probability distribution of 0, 
the lender has the option of investing some 
of his initial wealth in an opportunity which 
yields 0. If the lender can invest in such an 
opportunity, then one of the investment 
options in his feasible choice set is provided 
by investing the amount (w-l) in an oppor- 
tunity which yields p and an amount I in an 
opportunity which yields 0. This provides the 
terminal wealth function 
(4) x= (1+p)(w- 1)+(1+0)1= (l+p)w 
+(O-p)l, for all 0 
If y and z are both zero, then (4) dominates 
(3) and the potential lender will never prefer 
the loan to making the investment himself. 
Since a desire for credit by a nonmonopolistic 
potential borrower who does not supply col- 
lateral or equity will never be supplied, such 
a desire cannot be an effective demand for 
credit. We thus have: 
PROPOSITION 1: A nonmonopolistic poten- 
tial borrower must provide a positive amount of 
collateral or equity to transform a desire for 
credit into demand for a loan. 
No lender will ever supply a loan to a poten- 
tial borrower who does not provide a positive 
amount of collateral or equity as long as the 
borrower does not have monopoly control of 
a return distribution. Monopoly control of a 
return distribution is a stronger condition 
than monopoly control of an investment op- 
portunity. The former requires that the 
lender be unable, through any combination 
of portfolio and direct investment, to dupli- 
cate the distribution of returns on the poten- 
tial borrower's investment opportunity. 
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The preceding proposition is based on the 
hypothesis that the lender's feasible choice 
set includes an investment opportunity that 
yields the same probability distribution of 
returns as the potential borrower's prospec- 
tive investment. We will next extend the 
analysis to include a case where the potential 
borrower can ha've monopoly control of a re- 
turn distribution. The subsequent proposi- 
tions will depend on the hypothesis that the 
lender's optimal loan satisfies first- and 
second-order conditions for maximization of 
a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of 
wealth function. This will be called hypothesis 
H.1. Given this hypothesis, we need to exam- 
ine the first- and second-order conditions for 
maximization of the von Neumann-Morgen- 
stern utility function 
(5) f f 3 u(x)g(O,p,lr)dOdpd7r 
where x is the terminal wealth variable de- 
fined in statement (3) and g(*) is a joint 
probability density function. The first- and 
second-order conditions for maximization of 
(5) with respect to I are 
(6) f f { f u'(x)[0 p]g(O,p,7r)dO 
+ J u (x) [r -p]g(8,p,ir)dO } dpdr= O 
(7) D= ff{ u(A)[ r][(y + ry 
_A +z + irz/Q+y2(9,,) 
-+ J u"(x)[0 p]lg(O,p,r)dO 
+ f; u"(x)[r -p]2g(,p,ir)dO} dpdir < 0 
where t denotes the function that is derived 
from (3) by setting 0 equal to 0. 
We now proceed to proof of a second prop- 
osition on effective demand. Assume hypoth- 
esis H.1 and that the lender is risk neutral. 
As a consequence of H.1 we know that the 
lender's optimum loan satisfies the second- 
order condition (7). The risk neutrality as- 
sumption on preferences implies that the 
second and third integral expressions in (7) 
are everywhere equal to zero. Thus state- 
ment (7) requires that the first integral ex- 
pression be negative. Since y and z are non- 
negative, this expression can be negative only 
if y or z is positive and [@-r] is negative. 
But statement (2) implies that [O-r] is nega- 
tive only if y or z is positive.- Therefore, if a 
loan is to be supplied given the above hy- 
pothesis, the borrower must provide a posi- 
tive amount of collateral or equity. There- 
fore, we have: 
PROPOSITION 2: Given hypothesis H.1, 
any potential borrower must provide a positive 
amount of collateral or equity to transform a 
desire for credit into demand for a loan from 
risk-neutral lenders. 
Propositions 1 and 2 inform us that analy- 
sis of credit supply responses must involve 
study of lender response to changes in bor- 
rower equity and collateral as well as lender 
response to interest rate changes. One cannot 
explain "credit rationing," meaning unsup- 
plied effective demands for credit, without 
introducing the collateral and equity compo- 
nents of loan contracts that make the credit 
demand effective. We now proceed to exam- 
ine the comparative statics of the supply of 
credit. 
II. Collateral, Equity, and the Supply 
of Loans 
Derivation of the comparative statics of 
loan supply with respect to the interest rate 
leads to indeterminate results in the present 
model, as it did in the special case examined 
by previous authors. These results will not 
be reproduced here; instead, we examine 
lender responses to changes in collateral and 
equity. 
Considering the effect of changes in the 
amount of collateral, we differentiate (6) 
with respect to z and find that 
-l A 
(8) 
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where 
0X 0X 
(9) A = f f u (x)[- r] 
[(l+7r)/ (I+ y) ]g(O,P,7r) 
+ u" (x) [p a]0 
[1 + 7r ]g(O,p,r)dO dpd7r 
and D is defined in statement (7). 
Displacing the equilibrium with respect to 
y, we get 
ai M 
(10) D 
ay D 
where 
(1 1) M= J u'(x)[6 r] 
[(1 + 6)/(l + y) ]g(9,P,7r) 
+ uif (x) [p - 
[1 + O]g(O,p,7r)dO}dpd7r 
Since D is negative by the second-order con- 
dition (7), the signs of the relationships be- 
tween lender's optimal loan size and amounts 
of collateral and equity depend, respectively, 
on the signs of A and M, and will be positive 
if A and M are negative. 
We will proceed to examine various special 
cases of the model developed above. We will 
begin with the case of a risk-neutral lender. 
For such a lender, the expressions in (9) and 
(11) which contain u"(x) are everywhere 
equal to zero. The second-order condition 
(7) and statement (2) tell us that [0-r] 
is negative. We have proved the following 
proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3: Given hypothesis 1.1, a 
borrower can increase the size of a loan from a 
risk-neutral lender by offering more collateral 
or equity. 
We will next extend the analysis to com- 
prehend supply responses of risk-averse 
lenders. The resulting propositions will vary 
with the assumptions made about the ran- 
dom returns on the lender's alternative in- 
vestment and on the collateral asset. We will 
begin with the assumption that the lender's 
alternative investment yields the same con- 
stant stochastic rate of return as the bor- 
rower's investment, '. Substituting p=6 in 
(9) and (11), the second integral expression 
in each equation vanishes. Since the lender's 
alternative investment yields the random 
rate of return 0, the borrower does not have 
a monopoly of this return. Therefore, by 
Proposition 1, either y or z must be positive. 
Then fromii statement (2) we know that 
[0-r] is negative. We have proved the fol- 
lowing proposition. 
PROPOSITION 4: Given hypothesis H.1 and 
the hypothesis that the lender's alternative in- 
vestment yields the same random rate of return 
as the borrower's investment, a borrower can 
increase the size of a loan from a risk-averse 
lender by offering more collateral or equity. 
Of course if the borrower has monopoly 
control of a return distribution, the lender 
would have to make his alternative invest- 
ment in an investment opportunity that 
yields a rate of return that is distinct from 0. 
We will examine two cases where p and 0 are 
distinct and the lender is risk averse. The 
first case will employ the assumption used by 
previous authors that the lender's alternative 
investment is made at a certain rate of inter- 
est i. In addition, we assume that the rate of 
return on the collateral asset is this same cer- 
tain rate of interest. In this case, equations 
(9) and (11) can be rewritten as: 
(9') A = u'(x)[6-r][(1 + i)/( + y)]f(6) 
+ fu"(x)[i - 0][1 + i]f(0)d0 
+ f u"(x)[i - 0][1 + 0]f(0)d0 
-1 
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wheref(*) is the probability density function 
for 0. A sufficient condition for both (9') and 
(11') to be negative is that 6 is less than both 
i and r. Statement (2) implies that 6 will be 
less than i if the collateral plus equity to loan 
ratio satisfies the condition 
z+y r-i (12) .- > 
+i 
Clearly, a lender who prefers more wealth to 
less wealth will not make a loan if the rate of 
interest on the loan is less than the rate. of 
interest on his alternative investment oppor- 
tunity. Therefore, condition (12) is sufficient 
to ensure that 6 is less than both i and r. 
Thus we have: 
PROPOSITION 5: Given hypothesis H.1 and 
the hypothesis that the collateral asset and the 
lender's alternative investment yield the same 
certain rate of interest, a borrower can increase 
the size of a loan from a risk-averse lender by 
offering more collateral or equity if [(z + y) /l] 
The maximum of [(r-i)/(l+i)] on the set 
{(i,r): 4 percent?_i<r; 4 percent<r<18 
percent } is 13.5 percent at (i,r) = (4 percent, 
18 percent). Thus condition (12) is satisfied 
by the values typically observed in credit 
markets. 
Finally, we consider the case where p, 0, 
and 7r are distinct random variables and the 
lender is risk averse. This case requires that 
we evaluate A and M as given in (9) and 
(11). Since y0 and z>0, statement (2) im- 
plies that 6 <r. Therefore the first terms on 
the right-hand sides of (9) and (11) are non- 
positive. Statement.(2) also tells us that 6<<r 
if y>0 or z>0; in this case, the first terms on 
the right-hand side of (9) and (11) are nega- 
tive. The second terms on the right-hand 
.sides of (9) and (11) are nonpositive if 
prob {p_ 0 for all <? }I = 1, and are negative 
if prob{p@0 for all 0 } =1 and p>O for 
some 0<0. Thus we have: 
PROPOSITION 6: Given hypothesis H.1, a 
borrower can increase the size of a loan from a 
risk-averse lender by offering more collateral or 
equity if: 
prob{p >: Ofor all 0?} 
= 1 and (z + y) > 0; 
or probIp > Ofor all 0 < 0} 
= 1 and p > O for some <? 0 
We have proved various propositions on 
effective' demand for loans -and on the rela- 
tion of the amount of credit supplied to 
amounts of collateral and equity. All of the 
propositions follow from a model in which 
the proceeds of a loan are used to acquire a 
capital asset. This formulation applies to 
''consumer loans" such as mortgages and 
loans on consumer durables but does not ap- 
ply to loans to consumers for expenditures on 
services and nondurable commodities. The 
next section is concerned with the supply'of 
pure consumption loans, where a pure con- 
sumption loan is any loan the proceeds of 
which are not used to acquire a capital asset. 
III. Collateral and the Supply of Pure 
Consumption Loans 
The supply model for pure consumption 
loans can be developed easily by analogy 
with the model developed above. Given the 
rate of interest r on the loan and the random 
rate of return p on the lender's alternative 
investment, the lender's terminal wealth if 
the loan is repaid is (1+p)w+(r-p)l. Define 
q as the random total amount of payment 
that the consumer makes on the loan. If q is 
less- than the sum of principal and interest 
due on the loan then the loan is in default. 
Thus the default amount of payment q* is 
(1+r)l. Let the consumer provide a non- 
negative amount of collateral z in the form 
of an asset with random rate of return 7r. The 
lender will obtain payment of principal and 
interest on the loan, even though the loan' 
may be in default, as long as the sum of the 
borrower's payment q and the value of the 
collateral (1 +7r)z is not less than the princi- 
pal and interest on the loan. Thus the repay- 
ment amount of payment y is (1+r)1- (1+7r)z. 
If the amount of payment on the loan is less 
than q then the lender's terminal wealth is 
q+(1+p)(w-l) +(1+7r)z. Given hypothesis 
H.1, we can use the first- and second-order 
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conditions for maximization of a von Neu- 
mann-Morgenstern utility function with 
joint probability density function for q, p, 
and 7r. Finding al/az by straightforward dif- 
ferentiation of the first-order condition, and 
using the negativity of the second-order con- 
dition and the nonpositivity of u"(x), one 
can easily prove the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 7: Given hypothesis H.1, a 
borrower can increase the size of a pure con- 
sum ption loan from a risk-averse or risk- 
neutral lender by offering more collateral. 
Propositions 2-7 depend on the assump- 
tion of price taking behavior by lenders and 
thus do not directly apply to the attempt by 
Jaffee and Modigliani to show that credit 
rationing is profitable for monopolistic lend- 
ers. The next section fills in this gap. 
IV. Market Organization, Equilibrium, 
and Credit Rationing 
Jaffee and Modigliani attempt to demon- 
strate that if lenders are not price takers and 
exogenous constraints exist on interest rates, 
then rationing can be optimal for lenders and 
can exist in equilibrium. We argue that 
whether lenders are or are not price takers, 
credit rationing cannot be optimal for them 
at a market equilibrium unless institutional 
constraints are placed on the equity and col- 
lateral terms of loans in addition to the inter- 
est rate.' 
In Jaffee and Modigliani's discussion, 
lenders are assumed to be able to act like 
discriminating monopolists who face price- 
taking borrowers who differ in their demand 
functions for credit. Without exogenous con- 
straints on interest rates, borrowers who 
differ in their demands for credit would in 
general be charged different interest rates. 
By analogy with commodity markets under 
certainty, Jaffee and Modigliani conclude 
that if all borrowers must be charged the 
same interest rate, then lenders who could 
otherwise act as discriminating monopolists 
would ration some borrowers. They arrive at 
this conclusion by implicitly assuming that 
a borrower's offer to pay the interest rate 
represents an effective demand. When col- 
lateral and equity are introduced into the 
model, one does not need the assumption 
that lenders are discriminating monopolists 
to explain why borrowers with different de- 
mand functions for credit may be charged 
different interest rates. In general the market 
equilibrating process would result in the de- 
mands of various borrowers being satisfied at 
different collateral-equity-interest rate com- 
binations. 
We can easily demonstrate that with or 
without exogenous constraints on interest 
rates, credit rationing cannot exist in equi- 
librium. The amount of credit that a bor- 
rower demands will depend on the interest 
rate he must agree to pay and on the amount 
of collateral and equity he must provide. If 
a borrower is rationed, then the amount of 
credit supplied to the borrower is less than 
the amount he demands. Since the amount 
of credit demanded is a function of the inter- 
est rate, collateral, and equity terms of the 
loan contract, any one of the three possible 
two-dimensional representations of the de- 
mand function must show that the amount 
of credit supplied is less than the amount 
demanded if credit rationing is to occur. 
Consider Figure 1 which contains the sched- 
ule which relates the amount of credit de- 
manded to the amount of collateral for given 
d 
z 
T 
s4 
FlGE 1 d' 
FIGURE 1 
1 We assume atomistic borrowers; in other words, 
we exclude bilateral monopoly. 
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values of the rate of interest and the amount 
of equity. If credit rationing is to be optimal 
for a lender then there must exist a point S 
in Figure 1 that is below the demand sched- 
ule and represents an optimal transaction for 
a lender. However, point S cannot be optimal 
for a lender because point T, a point on the 
demand schedule, is in the lender's feasible 
set of credit transactions. Points T and S in- 
volve the same amount of credit, the same 
interest rate, and the same equity financing 
but at T the lender gets more collateral. 
If a lender is rationing a borrower, that 
lender is foregoing collateral that he could 
obtain without altering the other terms of 
the credit transaction or the terms of other 
transactions including other loans. Since the 
partial derivative of the lender's expected 
utility function with respect to collateral is 
positive for all z_?O, credit rati.oning cannot 
be optimal for any lender so long as there 
are no constraints on collateral. An analogous 
argument can be made for the equity com- 
ponent of credit transactions.2 
2 However, the demand for credit may not be a 
decreasing function of the amount of equity. 
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